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I.
Introduction
In criminal procedure, as in all law, context matters
immensely. The value of a particular mechanism can only be truly
understood within the context of the entire system in which it
operates.' That is why one should be incredibly cautious about
t Professor Richard E. Myers received his B.A. and M.A. from the University of North
Carolina at Wilmington, and J.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Myers joined the University of North Carolina Law School faculty in July 2004. He
teaches Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Ethics, and a seminar on White Collar
Crime.
I For more comprehensive studies of the context in which these rights operate, see
SUSPECTS IN EUROPE: PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT THE INVESTIGATIVE

STAGE OF THE

CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Ed Cape et al. eds., Intersentia AntwerpenOxford, 2007) [hereinafter SUSPECTS IN EUROPE] and EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL DEFENCE
RIGHTS IN EUROPE (Ed Cape et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL
DEFENCE].
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making predictions from thousands of miles and an Atlantic Ocean
away. Nevertheless, the extra-national commitment to the right to
counsel, under the precedents established by the European Court
of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR), has helped set the
European nations that are parties to the Convention on the path to
an increasingly adversarial system of criminal justice. The right to
trial contemplated by Article Six 2 is increasingly interpreted as an
adversarial trial with adversarial counsel.' If that is true, then I
predict that Europe's precedent will evolve over time toward a
more adversarial baseline and proceedings that permit adversarial
counsel to litigate various aspects of criminal cases will be
mandated.
Moreover, I predict that the ECtHR will encounter the same
set of institutional limitations that the U.S. Supreme Court has in
enforcing the right to counsel. First, courts are better at defining
and enforcing negative rights than positive rights.'
Second,
so
accuracy,
than
process
enforcing
at
better
are
Courts
Appellate
they tend to impose more process as their concerns about accuracy
rise. And third, appellate courts have no money to spend,6 so it
follows that they cannot get too far in front of the population
enforcing their decisions, especially when there may be core
concerns about legitimacy.
If these institutional limitations do in fact exist, then in
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
Amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, and Protocols to Said Convention, art. 6 (3)(c),
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ("Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
following minimum rights: . . . (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance
of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be
) [hereinafter European
given it free when the interests of justice so require.
Convention on Human Rights].
3 See EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL DEFENCE, supra note 1, at 23-24.

4 For an extended comparative discussion of the operation of the U.S. Supreme
Court and the ECtHR, see Gerda Kleijkamp, Comparing the Application and
Interpretationof the United States Constitution and the European Convention on Human
Rights, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 307 (2002).

5 This is, in part, because determining a "negative obligation concerns the question
whether the applicant is deprived of an existing right or denied a right which he has not
yet enjoyed," whereas defining a positive obligation requires "the state 'to cross a new
threshold of tolerance."' Id. at 320.
6 See Bruce Moyer, Washington Watch: Budget Cut Could Hurt the Federal
8, available at
at
2011,
May
LAWYER,
FEDERAL
Courts, THE
http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/washington-watch/May-2011 .aspx.
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practice, future ECtHR litigation addressing the commitment to
counsel who can meaningfully contest evidence will mirror,
especially to Americans, the litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court
over the last fifty years that established the contours of the right to
In implementing its
counsel in the U.S. federal system.
judgments, the ECtHR faces additional limitations imposed by the
concept of the "margin of appreciation."' For the right to counsel,
the limitations may be greatest in those settings where there is a
commitment to an inquisitorial system.'
If the U.S. experience can serve as any guide, it is just as likely
that an increase in adversarialness will negatively affect the
perception of defense counsel as it will improve it.9 If that risk is
realized, then the danger is a race to the bottom: the government
will only meet the minimum requirements and the public will
spend only as much as it must but not more, especially in trying
economic times.
II.
Differing Views on the Role and Value of Counsel
Those raised and trained in the United States are taught to
prize the adversarial system as the one most likely to produce just
results.'o In fact, it is so much an article of faith that I have found
questioning it quickly leads to lost tempers in some quarters. The
adversarial nature of the American criminal justice system and the
well-trained and active defense counsel operating within that

7 "Margin of appreciation" is the term used to describe the respect that the ECtHR
accords the widely varying choices for structuring justice systems that exist in the
European States. See Kleijkamp, supra note 4, at 325 ("[T]he doctrine of the margin of
appreciation permits neither total independence nor absolute sovereignty, but provides
the Member States with a certain latitude in enacting their own criteria and introduces a
factor of differentiation and even of relativism within the Convention.").
8 In the United States, the commitment to an adversarial system of criminal
justice is presupposed; this article argues that anything short of an adversarial system
will prove to be successful only in theory and not in practice. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 43-44 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing the adversarial system in the
United States).

9 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE,

80 (2001).
10 See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) ("The very premise of our
adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go
free.") (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).

N.C.
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system, serve two overlapping roles in society. The first is the role
of quality factfinder." The contest between opposing parties is
supposed to aid all in seeking the accurate determination of
particular cases, both by accurately identifying and convicting
those who did commit crimes and by identifying and releasing or
acquitting those who did not.12 The second role for adversarial
counsel is the institutional role of acting as an independent check
on legislative and executive power. 3 Thus, well-trained counsel
can speak out against injustice and highlight the unfairness that
can arise when the state applies a sanction to an individual, even in
a system that is operating within the rules that it has set for itself.
Some of the procedures adopted in the American system are
well-suited to the first, accuracy-based goal, but other procedures
undermine it in support of the second goal. In other words, some
of our adversarial methods are "truthfinding," but others are
clearly "truth-deflecting." 4 For example, aspects such as the
attorney-client privilege, the exclusionary rule, and an adversarial
ethical system for defense lawyers (who must contest evidence
that harms their client regardless of its accuracy), systematically
benefit guilty defendants, often at the expense of innocent
defendants, because they obscure the truth.'" Other accuracyreducing aspects, such as requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, can benefit both the innocent and the guilty defendant."
Society gains because of the innocence bias, in the form of fewer
improper convictions, but pays the price when guilty defendants
are returned to the streets." It follows that the more the public
recognizes defense counsel's role as a check on power, the more
suspicious it will become suspicious of defense counsel's values.
The inquisitorial model, because it relies on trained judges
committed to determining the truth, is in theory less susceptible to
1 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 8, at 42-43.
12 See id. at 42.
13 See KAGAN, supra note 9, at 15, (arguing that "American adversarial legalism"
is the result of the tension between a "political culture" and a "set of governmental
structures that reflect mistrust of concentrated power").
14 For a more detailed look at this effect, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 8, at 4243.
15 See id.
16 See id. at 46.

17 See id. at 47.
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appeals to passion and the obfuscatory practices of counsel, either
for the prosecution or the defense."
III.

Basic Right to Counsel

A. Due Process in the U.S. FederalSystem
The right to counsel in the United States is mandated by
judicial construction of both the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which guarantees the right to
counsel in all federal criminal cases," and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 0 which the courts have read to
incorporate the right to counsel against the several states within
the federal system.2 1 Specifically, the Constitution provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]."22
The Fourteenth Amendment further states, "nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 2 3 Over the years, the Fourteenth Amendment's
limitation on states' actions has been read to incorporate the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee, which had initially applied only to the
federal government. 24 The right to counsel, as it now stands,
means that the states are subject to the oversight of the federal
government, and the Supreme Court may reverse state court
convictions if it determins that they were arrived at in violation of
the Federal Constitution.2 5
B. US. Law - Gideon to Argersinger to Shelton
1. The Basic Right to Counsel in a CriminalCase
In the United States, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
18

See

SUSPECTS IN EUROPE,

supra note 1, at 7-8.

19 U.S. CONST. amend. Vi.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 8, at 583-90 (discussing historical overview of
case law behind this right.).
22 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963).
21

25 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 8, at 589-90 (providing a more in-depth look at

the current law and the federal-state relationship).
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assistance of counsel in criminal cases was originally interpreted
to require the federal government to permit privately retained
counsel to assist the defendant in cases in federal court.26 Over
time, in a line of cases starting with the landmark decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright,27 it has come to mean that the federal and
state governments have an affirmative duty to provide effective,
publicly compensated counsel to those who cannot afford it in any
case where the defendant, upon conviction, could receive a
sentence under which he might be incarcerated.28
The right was not enforced against the states until 1932, when
the Supreme Court first ruled that fundamental fairness, a
component of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution, required counsel to be provided in a timely fashion
to ignorant defendants facing the death penalty.2 9 Over time, the
Court chose to adopt the federal standard for provision of counsel
wholesale, through a process known in American law as selective
incorporation." The federal right was fully incorporated against
the states in 1963 in Gideon v. Wainwright, where the Court held
that the several states had a duty to provide and pay for counsel for
26 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942) (discussing the intention behind the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee: "In the light of this common law practice, it is evident
that the constitutional provisions to the effect that a defendant should be 'allowed'
counsel or should have a right 'to be heard by himself and his counsel', or that he might
be heard by 'either or both', at his election, were intended to do away with the rules
which denied representation, in whole or in part, by counsel in criminal prosecutions, but
were not aimed to compel the state to provide counsel for a defendant."), overruled by
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
27 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336-39 (denying the defendant counsel when facing
charges for robbery and holding that the states must afford counsel to defendants charged
with a felony).
28 See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 654-55 (2002).
29 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 8, at 63; see also Powell v. Alabama,, 287 U.S.
45, 47, 71-72 (1932) ("[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance,
feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or
not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that
duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to
preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case. To hold
otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that there
are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government which no member of the Union may disregard."') (quoting Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)).
30 See LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 8, at 69-70.
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all indigent defendants charged with a felony.3' According to
Gideon, "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This
seems to us to be an obvious truth."3 2 Since Gideon, the rule has
been expanded to include all cases in which the defendant serves
actual time incarcerated as a result of a conviction. In Argersinger
3 the Court held that the state was required to provide
v. Hamlin,"
counsel in any case in which the defendant might be given an
This protection was extended further in
active sentence.34
Alabama v. Shelton,3 5 where the defendant faced a suspended
sentence of two years, which could have resulted in incarceration
if activated." The Court held that the state was required to
provide counsel in such cases.37
2. Effectiveness: Strickland and Cronic
It is important to remember why the Court thought that Gideon
needed the assistance of counsel. In the United States, procedural
complexity, waiver, and the fact that the ultimate factfinder for
felonies is a lay jury all combine to make the assistance of a
lawyer crucial if the system is to work as designed. Further, the
notion of effective assistance of counsel is tied inextricably to the
adversarial process.38 The very definition of counsel is cast in
adversarial terms; the Supreme Court has held that so long as
counsel is sufficiently competent to ensure that the process was
adversarial in nature, the constitutional standard of providing
counsel has been met. 9 In United States v. Cronic 40 the Court
31

See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45. "Indigent" is a term of art, and means that the

defendant is unable to afford defense counsel. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 843 (9th

ed. 2009).
32 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
33 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
34 See idat 40.
35 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
36 Id. at 672-74.
37

Id

See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-57 (1984) (discussing the
effective assistance of counsel standard).
39 See id
40 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
38

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
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held:
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right
of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the
crucible of meaningful adversary testing. When a true
adversarial criminal trial has been conducted-even if defense
counsel may have made demonstrable errors-the kind of
testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred.4'

The test focuses on whether there has been an "actual breakdown
of the adversarial process."4 2
A defendant could be assigned the attorney who most closely
ekes past the minimal standards of competence in the jurisdiction,
and he would meet the standard so long as he was allowed to
contest the state and in fact did so. To show a constitutional
violation based on ineffective assistance of counsel, two factors
must be present: the attorney must be incompetent, and the
incompetence must have affected the outcome of the case.4 3 In
Strickland v. Washington4 4 the Court held: "The benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

process that the trial cannot be relied on as a having produced a

just result." 45 There are a limited number of circumstances where
the prejudicial effect required in the second prong will be
presumed; the complete denial of counsel, the refusal of counsel to
participate, and perhaps cases in which an unwaived conflict of
interest so substantially interferes with the ability of counsel to act
as an advocate that he would be deemed not to have participated.4 6
In the years between Gideon and Strickland, the federal courts
found a violation of the right to counsel in a limited number of
instances where a defendant was systematically deprived of
defense counsel, 47 but for the most part found ineffectiveness only

42

Id. at 656.
Id. at 657.

43

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

41

44 Id.
45
46
47

Id. at 692.
See id. at 692-93 (holding that prejudice is presumed for conflicts of interest).
See RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 169 (2d ed.
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when the actions of counsel were so poor as to reduce the trial to a
"mockery of justice."48 As commentators have noted, enforcing
competence while maintaining an arm's length relationship
between the state and the defense is extremely difficult. 4 9
The mockery of justice standard seems inordinately low, but
there are some justifications for it. The higher the level of
scrutiny, the greater is the impetus on the part of the trial judge
to intervene in derogation of basic premises of the adversary
system. Moreover, intervention may occur at a point of what
appears to be problematic action by counsel but in fact is an
integral part of a trial strategy known only to counsel.o
In Strickland the Court was careful to note that wide latitude
must be given to defense counsel to represent the defendant and
that judicial scrutiny must be "highly deferential."" According to
the opinion:
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the wide variety of circumstances
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such
set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected
independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel
must have in making tactical decisions.52
Since Strickland there has been widespread criticism of the
standard and of the Court's hands-off attitude toward structural
Notwithstanding
challenges to the provision of counsel.53
Gideon's promise that there would be counsel and Strickland's

2005) (discussing the difficulties with setting a standard for effective assistance).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.

Strickland,466 U.S. at 689.
Id. at 688-89.
53 See Stephen Bright, Counselfor the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime, But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1849-52 (1994) (discussing
structural issues with the ineffective assistance standard).
51

52
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promise that counsel would be competent, the states have
underfunded the defense to the point that lawyers labor under
crippling workloads, triage is necessary in deciding which cases to
aggressively defend, and vigorous representation is available only
to those who can afford it and some lucky subset of indigent
defendants.5 4
C. Baseline Rights by Treaty-the European Convention on
Human Rights and the European Court ofHuman Rights
The right to counsel in Europe is governed by Article 6(3)(c)
of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the
Convention). 5 Section (3)(c) of Article 6, which generally deals
with the right to a fair trial, provides: "Everyone charged with a
criminal offence [sic] has the [right] to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free
when the interests of justice so require."56
Under the terms of the Convention, judgments are legally
binding on parties to the Convention.5 7 Signatory parties to the
Convention are obliged to adopt the Convention's human rights
principles into domestic law and establish effective remedies in
domestic law for enforcing those rights." In practice, countries
have relied on a variety of methods for incorporating the
Convention and the ECtHR's judgments into domestic law,
ranging from giving the Convention quasi-constitutional status to
not incorporating the Convention into domestic law at all. 59 The
United Kingdom has taken the additional step of statutorily
requiring that the ECtHR's judgments be taken into account by

See id. at 12-13 (describing how states' defense programs are underdeveloped).
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 6(3)(c). ECtHR
decisions, since they apply to a very wide range of criminal justice systems, also tend to
provide fairly comprehensive discussions of domestic law regarding the issues being
brought before the court. Therefore, the opinions can also be useful in finding domestic
law in particular European states regarding right to counsel.
56 Id
57 Id. art. 46(1).
58 MARK WESTON JANIS, RICHARD S. KAY & ANTHONY BRADLEY, EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TEXT AND MATERIALS 431-33 (3d ed. 2009).
59 See id. at 448-50.
54
55
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domestic tribunals.60 The ECtHR's judgments are declaratory in
nature and parties to the Convention are free to choose the means
by which they comply with the judgment." If the ECtHR deems
State-based remedies inadequate, it is also entitled to award money
damages under the "just satisfaction" provision of Article 41.62
Under this provision, the ECtHR has awarded as much as thirty
million dollars in damages to private litigants.63
According to Professor Hodgson,
It is of course true that all EU Member States are members of
the Council of Europe and have ratified the [Convention] . . . .
However, the EU has acknowledged that compliance levels are
far from uniform and enforcement machanisms are weak ....
Furthermore, compliance may be achieved in different ways
through the "margin of appreciation," reflecting different
criminal procedure traditions."4
1. The Basic Right to Counsel in a Criminal CaseBenham, Quaranta, and Maxwell
Counsel must be provided at any proceeding that may have a
significant impact on the right of the accused to present a defense
in a criminal case.65 In analyzing the threshold question of
whether an action is criminal for the purposes of Article Six, the
ECtHR must consider three criteria: "(1) the classification of the
proceedings under national law, (2) the nature of the proceedings,
and (3) the nature and degree of severity of the penalty."66 The
first criterion, national law classification, is a starting point. The
second criterion is of greater importance and attempts to assess
whether the proceeding is criminal or civil in nature, with actions
60 KEIR STARMER, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (1999).
61 CLARE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION

ed. 2006).
62 European Convention on Human Rights, supranote 2, art. 41.
63 OVEY &WHITE, SUpra note 61, at 497.

ON HUMAN RIGHTS 491 (4th

64 Jacqueline, Hodgson, Safeguarding Suspects' Rights in Europe: A Comparative
Perspective, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 611, 618-49 (2011).
65
66

European Convention on Human Rights, supranote 2, art. 6(3)(c).
Benham v. United Kingdom, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 741, 756.
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brought by a government authority having indicia of criminal
proceedings.6 7 With regard to the third criterion, the ECtHR has
said that actions involving the potential deprivation of liberty are
criminal.6 1 In Benham v. United Kingdom69 the ECtHR held that
the detention of an individual in order to coerce him into paying
taxes constituted a criminal proceeding, despite the fact that the
proceedings at issue were civil under English common law.70 The
ECtHR said the fact that the defendant was at risk of three months
of imprisonment and that the action was brought by a public
authority supported treating the proceedings as criminal in nature
for purposes of Article Six.'
In order for a defendant to qualify for free assistance of
counsel, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the defendant must
lack "sufficient means to pay for legal assistance," and (2)
provision of counsel must be in the "interests of justice."7 2 This
first condition appears to generally be satisfied the defendant's
declaration of insufficient means, and another criterion indicative
of lack of sufficient means including appointment of free counsel
in prior proceedings.73 What satisfies the second condition is less
clear. In Quaranta v. SwitzerlanaP the court highlights two
factors to be considered in determining whether provision of
counsel is in the interests of justice: (1) the seriousness of the
offense and (2) the complexity of the case.7 5 With regard to the
first factor, it appears that the potential for deprivation of liberty is
always indicative of a sufficiently serious offense to warrant
provision of counsel.76 Nevertheless, in the absence of risk of
deprivation of liberty, the potential for large fines can also warrant

Id
Id.
69 1996-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 741.
70 Id at 756
67

68

7' Id.

Quaranta v. Switzerland, 205 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1991).
Tsonev v. Bulgaria (No. 2), App. No. 2376/03, Eur. Ct. H.R.
39 (2010),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int (click "search HUDOC case law;" select "HUDOC
database;" and type in application number).
74 205 Eur. Ct. H.R..
72
73

75 Id. at 17.
76 Id.
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provision of free counsel." The complexity of the proceedings is
assessed from the perspective of both the court and the
defendant. For example, the Quarantapanel said that the fact
that the proceedings involved the potential activation of a
suspended sentence as well as the fact that the defendant was "a
young adult of foreign origin from an underprivileged
background" indicated that the interests of justice supported
provision of free counsel.79
While the Convention makes clear that defendants have a right
to free assistance of counsel at trial, the ECtHR has also extended
this right to cover certain appellate proceedings. 0 The ECtHR has
said that whether a defendant is entitled to free provision of
appellate counsel (provided the Quaranta criteria are satisfied)
turns "upon the particular features of the proceedings involved;
account must be taken of the entirety of the proceedings conducted
in the domestic legal order and the role of the appellate or
cassation court therein."' As is the case with the interests of
justice analysis, the seriousness and complexity of the case are key
factors in determining whether a defendant has a right to appellate
counsel.82 In particular, in Maxwell v. United Kingdom" the
ECtHR held that "a case ... involving a heavy penalty, where
appellant was left to present his own defence [sic] unassisted
before the highest instance of appeal, was not in conformity with
the requirements of Article 6."84 In Granger v. United Kingdom,"
the ECtHR stated that complex grounds of appeal weighed in
favor of free provision of counsel.8 6 In Shulepov v. Russia," the
See Pham Hoang v. France, 243 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17.
Id.
79 Quaranta,App. No. 12744/87,
34 - 35.
80 See Shulepov v. Russia, App. No. 15435/03,
19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available
at http://www.echr.coe.int (click "search HUDOC case law;" select "HUDOC database;"
and type in application number).
81 Id. 19.
82 Id. 1 32 (citing Maxwell v. United Kingdom, 300 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 97-98
(1994)).
83 300 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 87.
84 Id at 97-98.
85 174 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
77

78

86 Id. 18-19.
87

App. No. 15435/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int
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ECtHR said that the failure to provide the defendant with counsel
when the appellate court had the power to review legal as well as
factual issues and the facts that the defendant had been convicted
of aggravated assault and murder, sentenced to prison, and forced
to appear before the appeals court via teleconference, violated
Article Six."
2. Effectiveness-Artico
As is the case under the Sixth Amendment in the United
States, the European Court has held that the right to free counsel
also encompasses the right to have the "effective assistance" of
counsel.8 9 The effective assistance inquiry has two components:
(1) the determination of whether the defendant was denied
effective assistance of counsel, and (2) whether the State had
adequate notice of this deficient assistance.90 The rationale for the
first prong is the "Convention is intended to guarantee not rights
that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and
effective; this is particularly so of the rights of the defence [sic] in
view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the
right to a fair trial . . . ."" Effective assistance of counsel requires
more than mere "nomination" of free counsel.9 2 In Artico v.
Italy,9 3 the Court held that Italy failed to provide the defendant
with effective assistance of counsel when the defendant's
appointed counsel informed the defendant that he could not
represent him because of other commitments.94 In instances where
it becomes apparent that the defendant's counsel is ineffective, the
state has a duty to remedy the situation by either compelling the
appointed counsel to provide effective assistance or replacing the
ineffective counsel.9' Illness of counsel and insufficient time for

(click "search HUDOC case law;" select "HUDOC database;" and type in application
number).
88 Id. iT 8, 34-36.
89 Artico v. Italy, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16 (1980).
90 Id.
91 Id
92
93
94
95

Id.
37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).
Id 8.
Id. 18.
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counsel to prepare have also been held to violate Article Six."
Effective assistance of counsel also requires that, if counsel is
insufficiently conversant in the defendant's native language, an
interpreter be provided to ensure the defendant is informed of the
nature of the proceedings.97
With regard to the second prong of the effective assistance of
counsel inquiry, the defendant must also show that the State was
on notice that her counsel was ineffective." The ECtHR has
explained the rationale behind this requirement:
[A] State cannot be held responsible for every shortcoming on
the part of a lawyer appointed for legal aid purposes .. . It
follows from the independence of the legal profession from the
State that the conduct of the defence [sic] is essentially a matter
between the defendant and his counsel ... The competent
national authorities are required under Article 6 § 3(c) to
intervene only if a failure by legal aid counsel to provide
effective representation is manifest or sufficiently brought to
their attention in some other way. 99
In Kamasinski v. Austria,'00 the ECtHR said that the State
court's awareness of a number of pre-trial meetings between the
appointed counsel and the defendant would not have put the State
on notice that counsel was ineffective.'o' Nevertheless, once the
defendant's counsel asked to be replaced at trial, the State was on
notice of the deficiency.' 0 2
Unlike in the United States, however, a showing that the
actions of counsel actually prejudiced the defendant is not
See Daud v. Portugal, 1998-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 739, 750.
97 See Kamasinski v. Austria, 168 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1989).
98 See id. at 33-34.
99 Daud, 1998-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 749-50 (Kamisinski, 168 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
96

33).
100 App. No. 9783/82,
Eur. Conv. on H.R. (1989)
available at
http://www.echr.coe.int (click "search HUDOC case law;" select "HUDOC database;"
and type in application number).
1ot Id. at 34
102 Id. It is important to note that the Court ultimately found that, despite the notice,
Kamasinski's counsel provided effective assistance at trial and thus the defendant was
not entitled to relief. Id.
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required. "There is nothing in Article 6, par. 3 (c) indicating that
such proof is necessary; an interpretation that introduced this
requirement into the paragraph would deprive it in large measure
of its substance. More generally, the existence of a violation is
5,103
conceivable even in the absence of prejudice .. "o
Enforcement of the Right
IV.
In the United States, state courts operate under a system of
dual federalism.104 The Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution requires that states follow the judgments of the U.S.
Supreme Court when the Supreme Court has determined that the
Constitution has created rights enforceable against the states. 0 5
On a case-by-case basis, defendants can appeal their convictions
and have their convictions reversed if they have not been accorded
the rights they are due.o' The several U.S. states are obliged to
incorporate the minimal due process rights into their codes of
procedure, and must ensure that defendants are afforded
counsel.'o7 The states have leeway to decide how to provide
counsel.'0 o They may use a public defender service, contract with
private counsel, pay private counsel on a fee-for-service model,
mandate a pro bono provision of service as a condition of
membership with the bar, or use a combination of these options.' 09
The states have generally been compliant with the duty to provide
some form of counsel. "o How good that counsel has been or must
be is discussed in greater detail below.
While the ECtHR does not have the same degree of
enforcement regulation as the U.S. courts, it has been effective in

103 Artico v. Italy, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17-18 (1980).
104 See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 , 394-96 (1985) (detailing the history of
the dual sovereignty doctrine).
105 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
106 See FED. R. APP. P. 3 (describing the right of appeal from district court
decisions).
107 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
108 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
109 See Susan Herlofsky & Geoffrey Isaacman, Minnesota's Attempts to Fund
Indigent Defense: Demonstrating the Need for a Dedicated Funding Source, 37 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 559, 568-71 (2011) (describing the various state systems).
110 See id.
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enforcing its judgments. " Nevertheless, as Professor Hodgson
notes, it too, faces limitations because "ECtHR pretrial defense
rights ... provide no remedy in the vast majority of cases-those

that do not proceed to trial, those disposed of by alternative means,
or those that are dealt with by a guilty plea .

. .

. More generally,

[the Convention] Article 6 is expressed in broad terms ....
" 12
addition to using peer pressure and appeals to the need for
European stability, two of the ECtHR's most powerful tools in
enforcing its judgments are the threat of expulsion from the
Council of Europe and the perception of party states that are not
members of European Union that having a good record with the
ECtHR is a precondition to joining the European Union." 3 The
expulsion authority is officially enumerated in the Council of
Europe's Statutes, but it has never been exercised.1 4 There is
some concern that as the ECtHR's authority expands beyond the
relatively homogenous group of Western European nations that
originally ratified the Convention, the ECtHR may have greater
difficulty in effectuating its judgments."' There is also concern
that as the ECtHR provides expanded protection of rights through
case law and infringes more and more on the sovereignty of
individual states, its enforcement ability may be weakened."' 6
With regard to the right to counsel covered in Article Six, there
has been an effort to develop remedies beyond financial
compensation." 7 Following such efforts, most contracting states
have created mechanisms in national law to reopen criminal
111 See JANIS ET AL., supra note 58, at 7 ("[T]he nations adhering to the Convention
have submitted to [the Court's] decisions with a willingness that can only be called
startling.").
112 See Hodgson, supranote 64, at 649.
113 See OVEY &WHITE,supra note 61, at 502-04.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 506.

116 See id. at 510-11 (noting that the ECtHR must "tread[] a delicate path between
developing and enhancing the standards inherent in the Convention text, and respect for
the choices which individual States must take in the face of specific situations"); see also
Taru Spronken & Dorris de Vocht, EU Policy to Guarantee Rights in Criminal
Proceedings: "Step by Step, " 9 (2011), 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG 436 (2011)
("[T]he Convention has been successful in setting general (miminum) standards but
since it does not provide for clear guidelines on how to implement them, the practical
and effective character of the Convention rights leaves much to be desired.").
117 See OVEY &WHITE, supra note 61, at 497.
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proceedings following findings of certain violations by the
In some cases, the Convention has explicitly
ECtHR."'
recommended retrial as an appropriate remedy for violations.l19
The Court also considers that where, as in the instant case, an
individual has been convicted following proceedings that have
entailed breaches of the requirements of Article 6 of the
Convention, a retrial or the reopening of the case, if requested,
represents in principle an appropriate way of redressing the
violation.120
A. Adversarialness
The pressure toward greater adversarialism under the
Convention is clear from two recent cases decided by the ECtHR:
Salduz v. Turkeyl 2 1 and Panovits v. Cyprus.12 2 In both cases, the
court identified the importance of custodial legal advice before
and during police interrogation, and further set Europe down the
path to Anglo-American adversarialism.123
Commentators have been noting the gradual shift.124
118

Id. at 498.

119 Id.

See Levinta v. Moldova, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. 40, 1129 (2008) (internal citations
omitted) and Popovici v. Moldova, nos. 289/04 and 41194/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 87 (2005),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int (select "search HUDOC case law;" select "HUDOC
Database;" and then type application number) (recommending retrial in a case where the
government relied on evidence extracted from the defendants via torture) (citing Ocalan
v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 45, 210 (2005)).
121 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 19, 421 (2008). In Salduz, the Court held:
[I]n order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently 'practical and
effective' Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be
provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is
demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there
are compelling reasons to restrict this right .... The rights of the defence [sic]
will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made
during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.
Id.at 437 (internal citations omitted).
122 App. No. 4268/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int
(click "search HUDOC case law;" select "HUDOC database;" and type in application
number).
123 See Hodgson, supra note 64, at 57.
120

124 EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (Mireille Delmas-Morty & J.R. Spencer eds.,
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The right to an 'adversarial' trial, the right to have one's
arguments heard, and the principle of equality of arms suggest a
certain type of relationship between the judge and the parties to
the proceedings, as well as between the parties themselves: these
relationships seem to point more toward an accusatorial system
and away from the inquisitorial tradition, although the European
Convention is careful not to impose an abstract model of trial.'2 5
Over the years, the ECtHR has decided a number of cases that
seem to increase this commitment.12 6 The core principle of
"equality of arms" seems incredibly difficult to define, but is
clearly a part of the case law.'2 7 The right to contest the evidence
in the file, with early access to that file by counsel, also suggests
an increasingly adversarial relationship.'2 8 Further, the right to
private consultation with counsel who will be committed to
advancing the defendant's interests suggests an adversarial posture
between the defendant and the state.12 9
B. Positive versus Negative Rights.

Whether a court will be effective at enforcing and executing its
judgments depends on the scope of its powers of redress. As a
general rule, in systems of divided government, courts are far
better at dealing with negative rights-finding a violation where
the state violates a "thou shalt not" commandment-than they are
at dealing with positive rights, where the state must provide a good
or service. 3 0 Courts have no money to spend, and enforcing
2005).
125 See id. at 548.
126 See Foucher v. France, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 234, 235

34 (1997) (explaining that
the concept of "equality of arms" is one of multiple features of a fair trial); see also
Bulut v. Austria, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 84, 103-04 (1996) (holding that "[e]ach party must be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place
him at a disadvantage vis-a-vis his opponent").
127 Foucher, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 235 1 34.
128 See id.
129 Chase Manhattan Bank v. Turner & Newall, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 1992)
("The privilege rests on the belief that in an adversary system, a client's full disclosure to
an attorney is a necessary predicate to skillful advocacy and fully informed legal
advice.").
130 See Kleijkamp, supra note 4, at 320.
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unfunded mandates is notoriously difficult.13' Appellate courts in
a multi-jurisdictional system lack the money to directly impose
their views regarding the scope of effective assistance of
counsel' 32 and have no authority to create implementing
legislation. To ensure that effective counsel is provided, they must
depend on the political branches that control the purse strings, and
that are responsive to lay intuitions of justice and the usefulness of
defense counsel, which may depart significantly from the
judgments of jurists, or of the legal profession more generally.'3 3
Therefore, I not so fearlessly predict that the European evolution
of the right to counsel will face the same principal limitation faced
by the U.S. states: money and the political will to invest in
adversarial defense counsel.' 34 In the United States, aggressively
adversarial defense counsel is viewed by the ordinary citizen in
many cases not as an aid to just outcomes, but rather as an
impediment. When choosing between hospitals, educational
institutions, and public defenders, the defenders often fall to the
back of the line. While it is possible that they will fare better in
Europe despite resource constraints, the reasons for that are not
immediately apparent from this side of the Atlantic. Structural
limitations in both systems mean that the courts only have so
much power. As Professor Hodgson has shown, the courts may
have hit a limit in Europe that mirrors the limit hit in the United
States, requiring proponents of the right to counsel to take their
advocacy to a different forum.'3 5 These parallels indicate that
there are lessons that practitioners in both systems might be able to
learn from each other.

131 See Moyer, supra note 6, at 8.
132 Cf id. (noting that budget cuts could cause the right of counsel to go unfunded).
133 One question I think astute readers may be asking themselves is: Is there a guild
concern? Do all these lawyers want more and better-funded lawyers because they and
their fellow guild members will benefit from the increased number of jobs and the
increased compensation, not because they are in fact necessary for justice to prevail?
134 Two other papers in this symposium reinforce this conclusion in far greater
detail. Professors Spronken and de Vocht, supra note 116, and Professor Hodgson,
supra note 64, seem to suggest that the court has reached its limits, and are suggesting
the the Council of Europe will have to become involved for the right to counsel to be
expanded appropriately.
135 See Hodgson, supra note 64, at 57.
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Funding the Enterprise
V.
Defense counsel is essential to an "effective adversarial
system," in U.S. terms, or its "equality of arms" counterpart in the

European context. The amount of access to counsel that is
required is a difficult concept to define, particularly in the abstract,
and even more difficult to enforce. The U.S. remedies have been
enforced via reversal of conviction and, due to the "case or
controversy" limitation, on an ad hoc basis.136 The various states
have responded by changing their processes to match the Supreme
Court's holdings, although there have been notable ebbs and flows
in the states' willingness to comply. The ECtHR rules are
enforced through a combination of monetary judgments and
domestication by the national governments of the procedural
changes recommended by the ECtHR.'" Certain ECtHR opinions
have included a very strong recommendation that reversal is the
only effective enforcement mechanism in particular instances.
Like the Supreme Court, the ECtHR operates under the limits of
the cases brought before it, and even with a rising caseload, has a
limited ability to police the States that it oversees.13 8
As noted above, positive rights are notoriously difficult for
courts to enforce because courts lack the power to spend money.13 9
The standard narrative suggests that one of the few positive rights
enforced by U.S. courts is the right to counsel in criminal cases.
The courts have had some success in the United States, in part
because there is a negative right behind the positive right-that is,
the state may not incarcerate a criminal defendant unless it has
provided counsel first.'40 Because the courts are entwined in the
processing of criminal cases, they can ensure that defendants are
not convicted by denying the prosecution access to the judicial
process. And since the courts have the power to refuse to
participate, they have more leverage as an institution than they do
in almost all other positive rights situations. Moreover, in the
United States, the courts retain the right to disqualify counsel from
136 See, e.g., Cornwell v. Bradshaw, 559 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2010) (denying
ineffective counsel claims).
137 See OVEY &WHITE, supra note 61, at 490.
138 See id at 520.
139 See Kleijkamp, supra note 4, at 320.

140 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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appearing before them, meaning they have leverage over the legal
profession.14 1 Even with that leverage, however, the courts have
had very limited success in forcing spending. 142
The U.S. Supreme Court's commitment to adversarialness and
the right to counsel exceeds the political commitment of the voters
in the several states.143 Therefore, the court's holdings, even in the
United States's highly adversarial system, have only been
By any definition, the systems for
marginally effective.144
providing access to counsel are still woefully underfunded.145 A
subcommittee of the American Bar Association held extensive
hearings with multiple participants in the United States criminal
justice system, culminating in a 2004 report. 146 According to their
research,
Overall, our hearings support the disturbing conclusion that
thousands of persons are processed through America's courts
every year either with no lawyer at all or with a lawyer who
does not have the time, resources, or in some cases the
inclination to provide effective representation. All too often,
defendants plead guilty, even if they are innocent, without really
understanding their legal rights or what is occurring. Sometimes
the proceedings reflect little or no recognition that the accused is
mentally ill or does not adequately understand English. The
fundamental right to a lawyer that Americans assume apply [sic]
to everyone accused of criminal conduct effectively does not
7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law § 20 (2007).
142 Cf Moyer, supra note 6, at 8 (stating the financial difficulties faced by courts
and public defense).
143 See generally, A.B.A. COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE (2004) (showing that while the Supreme Court has shown a
consistent commitment to ensuring the right to counsel for the indigent, local voters and
governments have not followed suit in funding public defender programs).
144 Donald Dripps, On Reach and Grasp in Criminal Procedure: Crawford in
California,37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 349, 379 (2011). Professor Dripps suggests
at least one reason why: "The Supreme Court's reach exceeds its grasp in the criminal
procedure field. Although the Court holds final responsibility for declaring the meaning
of the general language in the Bill of Rights, it lacks practical power to compel state
compliance with constitutional rulings." Id. at 63.
145 David A. Simon, Equal Before the Law: Toward a Restoration of Gideon's
Promise,43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 581, 586 (2008).
146 GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 143, at 1.
141
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exist in practice for countless people across the United States.147
Defense attorneys often operate under crippling caseloads to
the point where public defender services in multiple jurisdictions
have filed suit to prevent the courts from assigning them additional

cases.148 For example, in a 2008 lawsuit, the Miami-Dade County
public defender's office, a large system in Florida, reported that
the average number of felony cases being handled by defense
counsel in a given year had risen to nearly five hundred.149 Many
lawyers don't have time to have a meaningful discussion of the
facts of the case with their client, even in felony cases, leading to
what some have called "meet 'em and plead 'em" representation,
where the lawyer negotiates a plea deal without ever having
The courts have responded to defenders'
spoken to his client.'
complaints in different ways. Some have removed counsel from
misdemeanor cases, acknowledging that this means that those
defendants cannot be sentenced to incarceration. '' Others have
ordered members of the local bar to serve as pro bono counsel.152
Still others have ordered the public defenders to "tighten their
belts" and continue providing service.
One reason that may underlie the limited political commitment
to paying for defense counsel is the widely held belief that
adversarial counsel are sometimes an impediment to, not an
instrument of, justice. 154 Polling data from the United States
suggests that how the right is framed is an essential factor in

See id. at iv.
Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2008, at Al.
'49 Id.
150 See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 143, at 16.
151 See Eckholm, supra note 148, at Al.
152 See, e.g., Standing Order Regarding Pro Bono Representation (D. Conn. 2008),
at
available
http://www.ctd.uscourts.gov/PDF%20Documents/probonostanding order.pdf.
153 See Eckholm, supranote 148, at Al.
154 See generally Michael W. Smith, Making the Innocent Guilty: Plea Bargaining
and the False Plea Convictions of the Innocent, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 965, 18 (2010)
(stating that 49% of Louisianans believe giving public defenders more money will cause
justice to suffer).
147

148 Erik
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driving public support."' Support for defense counsel rises when
people are told that counsel are for the purpose of ensuring that
everyone has access to justice and ensuring that the innocent do
not go to jail.'56 When the question is framed that way, people are
willing to spend money to provide counsel.
Nonetheless, that is not always the view of the public, or, more
importantly, the legislature. Some police, prosecutors, and many
members of the public believe defense attorneys help the guilty
evade justice more often than they help the innocent receive it, and
those are potentially powerful constituencies. Adversarialness
infects relationships between many defense attorneys and
prosecutors, but perhaps more critically, it shatters any sense of
trust between many criminal investigators and the defense bar.
This lack of trust makes the investigators less likely to seek
information regarding defense theories and distrustful of sharing
information with defense counsel, believing that counsel will twist
the truth to help her client.
VI.
Conclusion
In some ways, the view that defense counsel will twist the
truth has a kernel of truth behind it. The adversarial defense
attorney has situational ethics-the attorney's first duty is to her
client, not to society, or to truth, except in some attenuated sense
that the adversarial system is more likely to lead to the truth
coming out."' Because of the nature of the relationship that
defense attorneys have with the truth, their capacity to serve as
The innocent
honest brokers is decreased, not increased.
defendant would likely be better off in a world with attorneys
obligated to tell and reveal the truth in all cases. Nevertheless,
because of other commitments like limited government, we buy
additional protection for the guilty at the cost of the innocent.
See, e.g., id. at 1-3.
156 Cf id at 3 (stating that after giving such information to voters, they were more
likely to support higher levels of funding).
157 Monroe Freedman famously argued that a criminal defense attorney has a duty to
obfuscate the truth. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1469 (1966).
Anecdotally, some defense attorneys do a far better job of retaining their personal
credibility with the other participants in the system than do others. Some agencies,
because of their known policies, actively undercut their ability to act as honest brokers.
155
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Whether or not those criticisms are true, enough people believe
them which has led to an underfunded defense bar in the United
States.
Enforcing the right to counsel comes with additional hurdles
beyond financing because monitoring the nature and quality of the
client-counsel relationship in criminal cases is extremely
difficult.'s In criminal cases, the defendant and his or her counsel
have an interest in keeping the state at arm's length for the
Because a court cannot
duration of the relationship.
of counsel's decisions and
the
quality
monitor
simultaneously
maintain an arm's length relationship, it must either time-shift'5 9 or
While much of the scholarship
outsource the monitoring.
considering this question suggests that the United States has much
to learn from the European States,16 0 this article suggests the
opposite is also true: the U.S. experience with judicial
enforcement of the right to counsel in a multijurisdictional
environment may have something to offer European scholars as
well. A critically underfunded commitment to adversarialness is
sure to be less effective than a well-funded inquisitorial system.
These risks, and the U.S. experience with them, suggest that the
ECtHR is right to proceed slowly in its judgments, particularly in
light of the margin of appreciation.

158 See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex
Ante Parity Standard,88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 264 (1997).

159 Doing this monitoring during the trial has led to what is called the "mirror test."
That is, if you can hold a mirror up to counsel's face and it fogs up, proving that he is
still breathing, he qualifies as competent counsel. Doing much more raises serious
questions about maintaining an arm's length and adversarial relationship, while still
giving due deference to the client's independent interests and counsel's exercise of
independent judgment. Ex post determinations regarding the competence of defense
counsel are difficult, but may be better than real-time management since in an
adversarial system, such a premium is placed on maintaining the arm's length
relationship between the state on the one hand, and the defendant and counsel on the
other.
160 See, e.g., SUSPECTS IN EUROPE, supra note 1; EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL DEFENSE
RIGHTS IN EUROPE, supra note 1.

